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A B S T R A C T
Psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (PNES) consist of paroxystic events facilitated by a dysfunction in
emotion processing. Models explaining the pathogenic mechanisms leading to these seizure-like
episodes are limited. In this article, evidence that supports dysfunction at the level of arousal tolerance,
cognitive-emotional information processing and volitional control is reviewed. A hypothetical
pathophysiological mechanism is discussed based on functional neuroimaging evidence from PNES-
related conditions and traits. This pathophysiological model suggests an alteration in the inﬂuence and
connection of brain areas involved in emotion processing onto other brain areas responsible for
sensorimotor and cognitive processes. Integrating this information, PNES are conceptualized as brief
episodes facilitated by an unstable cognitive-emotional attention system. During the episodes,
sensorimotor and cognitive processes are modiﬁed or not properly integrated, allowing the deployment
of autonomous prewired behavioral tendencies. Finally, I elaborate on how therapeutic applications
could be modiﬁed based on the proposed hypothetical model, potentially improving clinical outcomes.
 2010 British Epilepsy Association. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (PNES) are sudden, invol-
untary changes in behavior, sensation, motor activity, cognitive
processing (including change in level of consciousness), or
autonomic function linked to a dysfunction in the processing of
psychological or social distress. Unlike epileptic seizures, PNES are
not related to electrographic ictal discharges. Frequently mistaken
for epilepsy at onset, PNES are costly to patients and society1 and
their diagnosis is usually delayed on average for 7 years.2 Diagnosis
is conﬁrmed via video-electroencephalography monitoring in
about a quarter of patients referred to epilepsy referral centers.3
PNES signiﬁcantly impact quality of life.4,5
Numerous studies have linked PNES to a high prevalence of
comorbid psychiatric conditions such as mood disorders, anxiety
disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), somatoform
disorders, dissociative disorders and cluster B personality dis-
orders.6–10 Lifetime rates of physical and/or sexual abuse range
from 50% to 77%11 in individuals with PNES. Adding to the
complexity and heterogeneity of this population, diverse neuro-
logical conditions have been documented in PNES individuals
(history of mild head injuries, neuropsychological deﬁcits,
comorbid epilepsy, intellectual disability, etc.).12–16 New illnesses,
life events, relationship conﬂicts, exposure to certain medications,
illness representations and other cognitive and behavioral factors
also contribute to the development and perpetuation of PNES.17,18
The biological and psychosocial predisposing, precipitating, and
perpetuating factors enumerated above contribute to the multi-
factorial background of patients with PNES.19 These factors are
relevant for diagnostic and treatment considerations, but none of
them alone are sufﬁcient to explain how PNES develop. It is their
multifactorial interaction thatmost likely facilitates the expression
of PNES.
A critical review of studies addressing the deﬁnition, etiology,
treatment and prognosis in PNES can be found elsewhere.20 In this
review, I discuss a conceptualizationmodel for PNES and formulate
a cohesive phenomenological picture supported by the summation
of vulnerabilities present in these patients. I later review the
pathophysiological mechanisms of disorders with similar patho-
genic mechanisms as revealed by functional neuroimaging and
then formulate a speculative pathophysiological model for PNES.Finally, I brieﬂy discuss how this model could help elaborate and
reﬁne treatment strategies for PNES.
2. A conceptualization model for PNES
Themere explanation that PNES are not epileptic phenomena is
an unsatisfying explanation to patients and is unlikely to generate
positive psychosocial outcomes.21 Having a conceptualization
model that explains what PNES are, rather than simply what they
are not, can potentially engage patients more readily in treatment.
PNES constitute a heterogeneous population with varying
degrees of psychiatric background and somatic complaints.22,23 It
is unlikely that one single model can explain PNES for all subgroups
of patients. Certain traits that describe cognitive and emotion
processing styleshavebeen identiﬁed inPNES. Below, I discuss these
vulnerability traits and how in different routes and combinations,
they can lead to a common symptomatic expression.
2.1. Psychopathological mechanisms: dissociation, somatization and
PTSD
2.1.1. Dissociation and conversion
A model that explains involuntary dissociative states as
emotion-inﬂuenced processes facilitated by low levels of attention
has been proposed for medically unexplained symptoms.24 When
systematically screened for, dissociative disorders have been
reported in over 90% of PNES patients and dissociation has been
suggested as a common underlying mechanism in the develop-
ment of PNES.6 PNES patients comprise a heterogeneous group and
dissociative tendencies are more prevalent in the subgroup of
patients with signiﬁcant psychiatric background, usually with
trauma related diagnoses.22,25
While the Revised Text Edition of the Fourth Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) limits the
deﬁnition of dissociation to a lack of integration of mental
functions,26 some authors27 offer a broader conceptualization of
dissociation. Inspired by Janet’s original work, Nijenhuis28 offers a
phenomenological categorization of dissociative symptoms that
includes ‘psychoform dissociation’ (which includes a disruption of
the normal integrative functions of consciousness, memory,
identity and perception of the environment) and ‘somatoform
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conversion disorder and the Tenth Revision of the International
Statistical Classiﬁcation of Diseases and Related Health Problems
(ICD-10) as dissociative disorders of movement and sensation).
Kuyk et al.29 found higher rates of somatoform dissociation in
individuals with PNES when compared against individuals with
epilepsy. Other studies found higher rates of psychoform
dissociation in PNES than in epilepsy.30,31
Measures of somatoform and psychoform dissociation have
shown strong and consistent correlation with each other.32–34 In a
study done in the general population, the combination of high rates
of somatoform and psychoform dissociation but not each type of
dissociation by itself, has been associated with higher rates of
depressive symptoms, suicidal ideation, reduced working ability,
poor ﬁnancial situation and poor general health.35 Levels of
psychoform and somatic dissociation are similar between conver-
sion and dissociative disorders and higher in conversion and
dissociative disorders when compared to somatization disorder
and healthy controls.36
Some of the biological responses seen in dissociation have been
identiﬁed in PNES subjects. Individuals with PNES present with
elevated basal diurnal cortisol levels and this elevation is
independent of event occurrence.37 This ﬁnding is consistent with
the elevated cortisol levels and decreased cortisol suppression
during the dexamethasone suppression test (DST) found in
dissociative disorders38,39 but differs from PTSD where there is
enhanced cortisol suppression in the DST.40
2.1.2. Somatization
Somatization is another psychological mechanism frequently
encountered in PNES41 and it can be present with or without
dissociation. The personality proﬁle of PNES individuals usually
presents elevations in the hypochondriasis scale.14 New illnesses,
illness representations and health-related trauma have been
described in PNES6,19,42 and might facilitate the development of
PNES in a subgroup of patients with somatization tendencies. In
somatization, emotional states and arousal are thought to be
physiologically expressed in the body bypassing neurocognitive
processing, while in conversion or dissociation a neurocognitive
processing is thought to be responsible for symptom elaboration.43
This would support the conceptualization of somatization as an
avoidance strategy.
2.1.3. PTSD
PNES have also been conceptualized as manifestations of
PTSD,44 which has both intrusive and dissociative symptomatol-
ogies.26 The result can include a recurrent somatic or cognitive
experience related to the traumatic event or a poor ability to
integrate some of these past experiences cohesively in the present.
2.1.4. Summary: multiple mechanisms
The mechanisms discussed in this section could help frame
PNES as brief episodes that include any combination of psychoform
dissociation, somatoform dissociation (or conversion) and somati-
zation. Patients display a narrow range of cognitive ﬂexibility
either bymagnifying somatic or mental experiences or by partially
or completely losing their integrative capacity for certainmental or
somatic actions. The manifested mental or somatic phenomena
might or might not be related to past traumatic experiences.
2.2. Arousal tolerance
2.2.1. Limited arousal tolerance: hyperarousal and hypoarousal in
PNES
Another way of conceptualizing PNES phenomenology comes
from Ogden’s sensorimotor approach to psychotherapy in patientswith trauma-related disorders.45 According to this approach,
individuals with trauma-related disorders oscillate between
hyperarousal responses (characterized by hypervigilance, emo-
tional reactivity, and disorganized cognitive processing) and
hypoarousal responses (disabled cognitive processing and numb-
ing of emotions). Cortical functioning is required to integrate
information and is maintained while in the optimal arousal zone.
As a consequence, in the two extremes of hyper and hypoarousal
activities, information from cognitive, emotional and sensorimotor
levels cannot be integrated.
Although this remains a theory, a baseline level of autonomic
hypervigilance and a positive attentional bias when processing
social threat stimuli at a preconscious level have both been
documented in PNES subjects.46 Symptoms of hyperarousal during
the events are characteristic of PNES and are signiﬁcantly more
frequent during psychogenic attacks in a PNES group than during
epileptic attacks in an epileptic seizure group.31 A study comparing
lone PNES subjects versus individuals with combined epileptic
seizures and PNES found that autonomic signs and symptoms
(such as abdominal symptoms, tachycardia, palpitations, respira-
tory changes, and sweating) were the most commonly reported
ictal manifestation of PNES in both groups and present at a rate
higher than 50% in the lone PNES group.9 A recent publication,
however, has not found differences in autonomic nervous system
function between PNES patients and healthy controls as measured
by skin conductance and R–R interval variation during the post-
ictal and interictal periods.47
2.2.2. Sensory sensitivity
There is no data regarding speciﬁc sensory sensitivity in PNES,
although many patients do identify triggers for their attacks that
involve sensorymodalities such as auditory or visual stimulation. If
proven, this could possibly indicate a narrow sensory arousal
tolerance in PNES. This draws some similarities with migraine
headache patients, who have increased sensory sensitivity com-
pared to controls,48,49 although these results were not supported in
another study.50
2.2.3. Summary: a narrow window of arousal tolerance
It is reasonable to hypothesize that during PNES, patients
alternate between and can even simultaneously present with
symptoms representative of a ‘hypoarousal response’ and ‘hyper-
arousal response’. A hypoarousal response may manifest with a
disengaged cognitive process representative of a dissociative state
and with emotional distancing. A hyperarousal response may
manifest with hypervigilance, excessive emotional reactivity and a
cognitive processwith a narrow yet excessive focus, as could be the
case of somatic preoccupation. Triggers that can place PNES
subjects outside their narrow optimal arousal zone include
cognitive, emotional and even sensory stimuli, although a trigger
might not be recognized at times.
2.3. Emotional information and cognitive processing
The hypotheses cited above could explain some of the
phenomenology seen during PNES, but how PNES individuals
process information and how this information processing can
inﬂuence their vulnerability towards their attacks still need
clariﬁcation. Speciﬁc triggers for a PNES might be difﬁcult to
recognize probably due to the altered information processing of
preconscious, emotionally charged stimuli in these patients.46
2.3.1. Alexithymia
Alexithymia is deﬁned as difﬁculty in verbal expressions of affect
leading to an expression of inner psychic distress in the form of
physical complaints and description of emotions as physiological
G. Baslet / Seizure 20 (2011) 1–134reactions as opposed to feelings.51 Subjects with PNES rated higher
than controls in a self-report measure of alexithymia (the Toronto
Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20)52,53), but this difference disappeared
when depression and anxiety factors were controlled for. Speciﬁc
subscales of the TAS-20 that highlight difﬁculty identifying feelings
and difﬁculty describing feelings showed signiﬁcant impairment in
PNESsubjectswhencomparedtocontrols, but the inﬂuencing roleof
anxiety and depression, respectively, for each subscale, cannot be
ruled out.54Measures of alexithymia do not differ between epileptic
and PNES subjects.54,55 Although emotion awareness has not been
systematically studied in PNES with objective measures of
emotional awareness, subjects with other somatoform disorders
have scored lower on the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale56
when compared to other psychiatric groups.57Whether alexithymia
is neurologically mediated, a psychological manifestation of
repression or a combination of both remains unanswered.
2.3.2. Avoidance tendencies
A higher level of avoidance behaviors in PNES compared to that
in epilepsy patients31 might represent a particular way of
processing emotionally relevant information. Experiential avoid-
ance is a broad concept that refers to a general tendency to avoid
any aspect of internal experience evaluated as aversive and it has
not been formally evaluated in PNES. Experiential avoidance has
been associated to the severity of depression, anxiety and
somatization in individuals exposed to potentially traumatic
experiences, even when their post-traumatic stress severity was
controlled for.58
2.3.3. Cognitive difﬁculties
Not uncommonly, individualswith PNES presentwith subjective
cognitive complaints beyond their cognitive alteration during the
attacks. Cognitive impairments in PNES have been proposed to
represent a problem with motivation, not necessarily intentional,
rather than amanifestation of neuropathology.14,59 Difﬁcultieswith
attention and distractibility are described in individuals with
trauma-related disorders,60 which at least a subgroup of PNES are
considered part of. Although the exact mechanism of cognitive
impairments in PNES remains unknown, it would be reasonable to
hypothesize thatbothbiological andpsychosocial factorsplaya role.
2.3.4. Summary: attention styles in PNES
Adaptive attention enables an active balance between being too
distracted, unfocused, erratic, or ﬂighty and being overly focused,
compulsive, obsessive, or ﬁxated.45 These two extreme attentional
response styles represent the cognitive processing aspects of the
hyper- and hypoarousal responses previously discussed. Taking
into account the evidence cited above, I would like to propose that
alterations in emotionally relevant information processing as well
as inconsistent cognitive task performance represent variability in
attentional resources.
In other words, PNES patients at baseline may process their
emotional and cognitive information inconsistently and within a
limited range of options. With emotion processing, theymight have
a difﬁcult time identifying or describing feelings or might be overly
focused on their emotional state or become easily emotionally
dysregulated.With cognitive processing, theymight have a difﬁcult
time engaging ormaintaining their attention focus or theymight do
so with excessive selection towards certain aspects of their
experience at the expense of other seemingly avoided aspects.
2.4. Automaticity, volition and autonomous stereotypical behaviors
2.4.1. Automaticity in different psychopathological mechanisms
Most of the information processing that inﬂuences human
behavior is done automatically, outside of our awareness, allowinga seemingly continuous interaction with the environment.61
Beere’s perceptual theory of dissociation asserts that dissociative
perception stems from a blocking-out of the perceptual back-
ground or of one of its components (namely identity, mind, body,
world and concept of time). Dissociation then represents a
disruption of this constant and automatic integrated perception.62
In somatization, regular, automatic cognitive processes are
bypassed and psychological distress is expressed through magni-
ﬁed somatic symptoms.43
2.4.2. Automaticity and volition
Whether PNES occur in the context of dissociation, somatiza-
tion, PTSD or any combination of these mechanisms, how is it
that patients cannot exert any control over their attacks?
Psychogenic movement disorders might represent a simpler,
more circumscribed behavioral response in the context of similar
tendencies, fromwhich we could borrow some understanding for
PNES. Psychogenic movements share some brain mechanisms
with voluntary movements63 and hence there is a proposed
disconnection between movement production and sense of
volition.64 Spence65 has proposed that psychogenic movement
disorders ‘behave’ as if dependent upon prefrontal executive
resources because they are ‘worsened’ by attention to action,
they diminish with distraction and they disrupt routine,
automated behaviors or movements. He hypothesizes two
mechanisms by which psychogenic movements might emerge:
either a failure to generate new actions and/or a suppression of
an ongoing action.
The issues of automaticity and volition become more difﬁcult
to understand in PNES because, besides the somatic manifesta-
tions (conversion or somatoform dissociation), there can be
additional disruption of mental functions (i.e., amnesia and
diminished consciousness) andmany of the stereotypic responses
seen in PNES are more complex than particular, circumscribed
movements. However, the disconnection between a behavioral or
sensorimotor response and sense of volition, and the ‘boycott’ on
automatic processes are useful concepts that can be extrapolated
to PNES. The blocking-out of cognitive functions in dissociation or
the bypassing of cognitive processes in somatization can
conceptually help explain the inability to exert volitional control
over the attack.
2.4.3. Hypnotizability and suggestibility
Hypnotizability and suggestibility modify the relationship
between external factors, behavioral response and volitional
control. Individuals with PNES are more susceptible to hypnosis
than individuals with epilepsy,66,67 although a study looking at
PNES subjects versus healthy controls did not reveal any difference
in terms of hypnotic susceptibility.68 Event induction through
hypnosis has actually been evaluated to help discriminate between
epileptic seizures and PNES,67,69 andmay be a helpful technique to
aid in the diagnosis of PNES. Suggestibility can be useful as a
diagnostic and therapeutic tool and it also indicates a cognitive
process that bypasses other routine, maybe automatic steps,
through the selective use of attention resources.
2.4.4. Autonomous stereotypical behaviors
Whether the physiology underlying the speciﬁc symptoms of
the events per se mimics voluntary actions needs to be
investigated; however, the pleomorphic semiology of PNES might
make this a difﬁcult task to study. The fact that PNES can be
stereotypical in their presentation (i.e., movements, speech
alterations and autonomic symptoms)70 supports the idea that
probably most of the autonomous behavioral responses seen
during the attacks are pre-wired responses that are cognitively
impenetrable and may have inter-individual variability.
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Finally, I would like to propose that an unstable, rather inﬂexible,
cognitive-emotional attention system could explain the episodic
disengagement of volitional-sensing systems, variablemotivational
engagement and disruptions in the perceived continuity of
automatized behaviors. This same unstable cognitive-emotional
attention system can explain the increased suggestibility seen in
thesepatients. This instability is also reﬂected in thenarrowrangeof
arousal tolerance, emotional experienceand cognitiveandvolitional
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Fig. 1. Conceptual framework for PNES: vulnerable cognitive-emotional processing sy
ﬂuctuating between extremes of cognitive, physiological and emotional functioning. T
patient’s predisposition towards PNES. Relationships between these traits in related paengagement that PNESpatients can optimallymaintain.Manyof the
vulnerabilities seen in PNES represent extreme levels of arousal,
emotional experiences and cognitive engagement or functioning
that in different combinations and through different mechanisms
can lead to a similar clinical presentation (Fig. 1).
PNES can be conceptualized as involuntary, stimulus driven
behavioral responses facilitated by an orienting tendency
where cognitive, emotional and sensorimotor systems are not
seemingly integrated. They are likely triggered by stimuli thatstem. Patients with PNES function within a limited range of adaptive behaviors,
hese trait vulnerabilities, in different combinations, can hypothetically increase a
thologies are discussed in the text. PNES: psychogenic non-epileptic seizures.
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outside of awareness. In other words, during an attack, a stimulus
(either external or internal) de-stabilizes an already vulnerable
cognitive-emotional system; the end result is a behavioral
response where integration of several systems is not achieved
as it routinely occurs automatically. During an attack, these
cognitive, emotional and sensorimotor systems become tempo-
rarily autonomous, with some of their functions becoming the
excessive focus of attention and/or by attention being unable to
generate the routinely organized perceptual or behavioral picture.
2.5. Relationship between vulnerability traits
In the sections above, I presented a discussion of certain traits
identiﬁed in PNES and how these might interact to explain the
proposed phenomenology behind PNES. In this section, I discuss
how some of these traits relate to each other and may share some
common mechanisms in both clinical and non-clinical samples.
2.5.1. Relationship between alexithymia and other vulnerability traits
Difﬁculty identifying feelings, a measurement of alexithymia,
has been positively correlated to lifetime prevalence, numbing,
hyperarousal and anxiety sensitivity in PTSD,71–73 and with
frequency of dissociative experiences in clinical and non-clinical
samples.74–78 Level of alexithymia is associated with blunted
sympathetic reactivity79 and helps predict heat pain sensitivity
and various dimensions of psychopathology including depression,
anxiety, somatization, obsessionality and interpersonal sensitivi-
ty.80,81 Harm avoidance trait was found to be a predictor of
alexithymia in clinical and non-clinical samples.82–84 Difﬁculties in
emotion processing are associated to several of the trait
vulnerabilities present in PNES including dissociation, extreme
arousal responses (including sensory and emotional sensitivity),
avoidance tendencies and somatization. Alexithymia may inﬂu-
ence the development of many of these other traits.
2.5.2. Relationship between dissociation and arousal tolerance
A higher level of dissociation is related to increased emotional
and physiological reactivity85–89 and helps emotional and sensory
discrimination.90,91 In other studies, however, level of dissociation
was correlated with decreased physiological reactivity92 and with
higher levels of pain threshold.93,94 These ﬁndings support a link
between dissociation and extremes of physiological reactivity to
both sensory and emotional stimuli, suggesting a change in arousal
tolerance in dissociation.
2.5.3. Cognitive processing style in dissociation
Cognitive deﬁcits including information processing speed,
distractibility and deﬁcits in attention and verbal memory have
been associated to dissociative tendencies in clinical popula-
tions.95,96 Dissociative processing style is characterized as a
tendency towards multiple streams of information processing as
opposed to selective information processing, a weakened cognitive
inhibitory functioning that allows these streams to be operational
and directing of awareness towards some and away from some of
these information streams.97,98 Similarly, hypnosis is facilitated by a
division of consciousness into two or more information streams,
separated by a cognitive barrier preventing access to executive
functions, monitoring functions or both.99 Degree of state dissocia-
tion is also related to the degree of perceptual priming for objects
related to trauma,100 indicating a biased perceptual processing for
emotional stimuli indissociation. It is likely thatwhat isperceivedas
cognitive deﬁcits indissociative patients is the result of variability in
selective attention inﬂuenced by emotional states.101,102
From the evidence enumerated above, it can be concluded that
dissociation, a mechanism often present in PNES, is associated to anarrow window of arousal tolerance and to a labile emotional and
cognitive information processing. Because of the variability in
selective attention seen in dissociation, some cognitive or
emotional functions will suffer in performance during dissociative
states while other functions will be magniﬁed. In this light,
dissociation may be a constructive effort to avoid sensitive
emotional material through cognitive and emotional distancing
from some and magniﬁcation of other material. Frewen and
Lanius103 suggested that fear-induced arousal is overly suppressed
in dissociative responses in PTSD. This is an example of the altered
relationship that exists in dissociation between physiological
responses and cognitive or emotional processing.
2.5.4. Cognitive processing style in somatization and PTSD
A hypothetical attentional bias that selects somatic symptoms
for conscious attention has been proposed to play a role in the
genesis of medically unexplained symptoms104 and in conversion
disorder.65 Extreme levels of hypnotizability may contribute to
somatic distress through either a tendency to become intensely
absorbed in noxious sensations or an inability to block noxious
sensations with normal levels of concentration and absorption.105
Fibromyalgia patients have a heightened subjective sense of
pleasure or displeasure but no difference from controls in
physiological measures of arousal.106 These ﬁndings support
somatization, another mechanism involved in PNES, as the result
of a dysfunction in selective cognitive and emotional processing.
Poor cognitive control renders a more vulnerable cognitive
system that can be easily distracted by intrusive, emotionally
relevant memories or experiences,107,108 as it has been suggested
in PTSD reexperiencing and hyperarousal symptoms.103 Poor
cognitive control is also associated to emotional lability.109 Taken
together, somatization and PTSD re-experiencing and hyperarous-
al symptoms share a cognitive system characterized by poor
inhibition of speciﬁc emotionally relevant content, including
unpleasant physical experiences.
2.5.5. Summary
In summary, some of the vulnerability traits seen in PNES are
strongly related to each other in certain clinical populations, as in
the case of alexithymia and dissociation, while other relationships
are not clearly established, as in the case of somatization and
physiological reactivity. Although conceptually different, it is likely
that many of the vulnerability traits of PNES share some
similarities with each other explaining their common co-occur-
rence and suggesting shared mechanisms between them.
3. Speculating a pathophysiology
Functional neuroimaging has been the study methodology of
choice to elucidate healthy and altered cognitive and emotional
processing. The literature is scant for pathophysiological mecha-
nism studies in PNES subjects during an event and in between
them. A speculation about the pathophysiology of the disorder can
only be based on other disorders with similar pathogenic
mechanisms. For this reason, we will brieﬂy turn our attention
to other conversion and dissociative disorders as models that can
explain the underlying pathophysiology in PNES. I will also discuss
functional neuroimaging ﬁndings in PNES vulnerability traits and
hypnosis. For a summary of these ﬁndings, see Table 1.
3.1. Functional neuroimaging studies in other conversion disorders
3.1.1. Conversion paralysis
In the case of conversion paralysis, decreased regional cerebral
blood ﬂow (rCBF) in the area of the brain responsible for the
impaired movement has been demonstrated.110,111 Conversion
Table 1
Brain imaging studies in PNES-related disorders and vulnerability traits.
Conversion paralysis
 Decreased CBF in motor areas responsible for deﬁcit110,111 and decreased activity in motor areas during motor task115 and during movement observation.113
 Excessive activity in OFC and ACC during motor task111; excessive metabolism in right OFC compared to feigners during motor task116; decreased activity of right
OFC compared to feigners during motor task115 and compared to feigners during no-go trials114; increased activation of left inferior frontal gyrus compared to
feigners during motor task.115
 Decreased activity in DLPFC112 and compared to feigners during motor task.115
 Increased activity in bilateral putamen115 and increased metabolism in left putamen116 and left thalamus116 compared to feigners during motor task.
 Enhanced functional connectivity between motor-related areas and brain regions responsible for emotion processing114,118 and self-representation114 during
motor task.
Conversion sensory deﬁcit
 Decreased CBF in contralateral basal ganglia and thalamus119 during sensory task.
Psychogenic tremor
 Decreased activity at right TPJ and lower interaction between sensorimotor cortices and TPJ compared to voluntary tremor.121
Dissociative identity disorder
 Increased activation in dissociated PTSD of right ACC, medial prefrontal cortex, medial frontal gyrus, medial parietal lobe and bilateral inferior frontal gyri after
traumatic scripts.126
 Decreased CBF in bilateral OFC and superior and medial frontal regions in host states.127
 Activation of somatosensory areas and other areas responsible for negative emotional states in traumatic identity states compared to neutral identity states
during traumatic scripts.128
Dissociative amnesia
 Increased activation in DLPFC and decreased activation in hippocampus during memory retrieval of dissociated memories compared to nondissociated memories.129
 Decreased metabolism in right inferior frontal gyrus in dissociative amnesia at rest.130
 Activation of amygdala and right inferior frontal gyrus during cued recall of dissociated memories compared to nondissociated memories.131
Alexithymia
 Increased metabolism in sensorimotor cortices and left insula during emotional stimuli compared to controls.132
 Decreased metabolism in ACC during emotional stimuli compared to controls.132
 Negative correlation with amygdala activation during emotional stimulation.133,134
Avoidance tendencies
 Increased amygdala activation when confronted with threatening stimuli136; level of activation correlates with avoidance behaviors.135
Hypervigilance and somatization
 Activation of insula and dorsal ACC correlates with interoceptive heartbeat sensitivity.137
 Increased activation in dorsal and rostral ACC, left amygdala and posterior parietal regions during threatening stimuli in PTSD compared to controls.138
 Activation of right parietal cortex during interoceptive attention to heartbeat compared to external attention in controls.141
 Activation of insula and ACC during sham mobile phone radiation in somatoform patients compared to controls.143
Hypnosis
 Increased ACC activation during cognitive conﬂict task after induction not accompanied by DLPFC activation in high hypnotizable individuals.145
 Reduced ACC activation during cognitive conﬂict task after induction in high hypnotizable individuals.146
CBF: cerebral blood ﬂow; OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; ACC: anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; TPJ: temporo-parietal junction; PTSD: post-
traumatic stress disorder.
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orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex in the absence of
motor cortical activation111 and with decreased activation in
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex probably reﬂecting impaired action
generation.112
Individuals with conversion hand paralysis showed decreased
activation of cortical hand areas during movement observation
when compared to controls in a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) study.113 This ﬁnding raises the possibility that not
only movement initiation but also movement conceptualization is
impaired in conversion.
Another fMRI study showed a differential activation pattern of
cognitive inhibitory systems in a patient with conversion paralysis
versus healthy controls feigning paralysis. Frontal areas subserving
inhibition were not activated during no-go trials in the conversion
patient compared to the healthy feigners. Interestingly, the
conversion patient also demonstrated enhanced functional con-
nectivity of the right motor cortex (contralateral to the side of
weakness) with the posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus and
ventromedial prefrontal cortex, areas involved in self-related
representations and emotion regulation.114 In another fMRI study
comparing conversion paralysis and simulated weakness, both
groups showed similarly decreased activity in the corresponding
motor cortex, but conversion patients showed activation in
bilateral putamen and lingual gyri, left inferior frontal gyrus, left
insula and deactivation in right middle frontal and orbitofrontal
cortices.115
A positron emission tomography (PET) study also demonstrated
relative increases in metabolism in the right orbitofrontal cortex,
right cerebellum, left thalamus and left putamenduring subjectivelyexperienced paralysis compared to feigned paralysis.116 Hypnotical-
ly induced paralysis also showed increased activation of the
orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex, probably repre-
senting similar mechanisms utilized in conversion paralysis.117
Patients with motor conversion disorder have shown greater
functional connectivity between the right amygdala and the right
supplementary motor area during both fearful and happy stimuli
compared with healthy volunteers.118 This greater functional
connectivity suggests a greater inﬂuence of limbic regions over
motor preparatory regions during states of arousal, which may
underlie the pathophysiology of motor conversion symptoms.
3.1.2. Conversion sensory deﬁcit
In individuals with conversion unilateral sensorimotor loss,
decreased rCBF was documented in the contralateral basal ganglia
and thalamus, which normalized when symptoms resolved.119
This ﬁnding would support a striato-thalamo-cortical circuit
dysfunction in the generation of the conversion symptoms. An
fMRI study of three individuals with sensory conversion disorder
found that stimulation of the affected limb did not produce
activation of the contralateral primary somatosensory region,
whereas bilateral stimulation did, suggesting that bilateral
stimulation acted as a distractor overcoming the inhibition
observed with unilateral stimulation.120
3.1.3. Psychogenic tremor
Voon et al.121 demonstrated decreased fMRI activity at the right
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and lower TPJ and sensorimotor
cortex interactions in psychogenic tremor compared to voluntary
tremor, reﬂecting the lack of self-generation perception that is
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of self-agency,122,123 and Voon et al.’s121 is the ﬁrst study
implicating a dysfunction at the level of self-agency brain regions
in a conversion disorder.
3.2. Functional neuroimaging studies in dissociative disorders
The literature from dissociative disorders might also add to our
understanding of the dissociative process underlying PNES, at least
in a subgroup of patients. Dissociative amnesia and dissociative
fugue have been related to decreased frontal activation.124,125
3.2.1. Dissociative symptoms in PTSD
Lanius et al.126 studied sexual abuse-related PTSD patients
with dissociative disorder and compared themwith sexual abuse
victims who did not suffer from PTSD. After a traumatic script
was read, they were assessed for severity of dissociation and
scanned using fMRI. Compared to the control group, the
dissociated PTSD group showed greater activation of right-sided
superior and middle temporal gyri, anterior cingulate, medial
parietal lobe, medial frontal gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex
and greater bilateral activation of inferior frontal gyrus and
occipital lobes.
3.2.2. Dissociative identity disorder
A single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) study
done in individualswith dissociative identity disorder (DID) during
their host state showed that, compared to controls, DID subjects
presented decreased rCBF in the orbitofrontal region bilaterally
and decreased rCBF in medial and superior frontal regions and
occipital regions bilaterally.127 Traumatic and neutral identity
states in DID subjects have clearly shown differential brain
activation patters during a traumatic script reading in a PET
study. Compared to neutral scripts, during traumatic scripts, the
traumatic identity states tended to activate somatosensory and
other brain areas responsible for negative emotional states.128 This
latter study supports different emotional processing in different
identity states in DID.
3.2.3. Dissociative amnesia
In a recent report of two individuals with dissociative amnesia,
efforts to retrieve repressed memories showed increased activa-
tion of the prefrontal cortex which was associated to decreased
activation of the hippocampus, raising the possibility that the
prefrontal cortex inhibits hippocampal activity in memory
repression.129 Decreased glucose metabolism in the right infer-
olateral prefrontal cortex at rest, a region known to be involved in
the retrieval of autobiographical memories, has been reported in
individuals with dissociative amnesia.130
An interaction between emotion processing systems, dissocia-
tive cognitive functions and conversion has been described in a
patient in whom cued recall of a repressed event was associated
with brain activations characteristic of emotional arousal (amyg-
dala and right inferior frontal lobe). A spontaneously reported
severe event from the past did not result in the same level of
activation. The recall of the repressed memory was also associated
with decreased activity in the area corresponding to the paralyzed
limb.131 This study highlights the inﬂuence of limbic regions over
the brain areas responsible for the conversion or dissociative
symptom.
3.3. Functional neuroimaging studies in related vulnerability traits
In this section, I review the functional neuroimaging evidence
for the vulnerability traits previously described in PNES in both
clinical and non-clinical samples.3.3.1. Alexithymia
In a PET study that evaluated response to emotional stimuli,
participantswith alexithymia activatedmore parts of their sensory
andmotor cortices and insula, especially on the left side, and less of
their anterior cingulate, compared to the control group.132 Level of
alexithymia has been negatively correlated to amygdala activation
in fMRI studies with emotional facial stimulation.133,134 Based on
these ﬁndings, alexithymia is characterized by decreased involve-
ment of brain areas typically involved in emotion processing
(amygdala and cingulate cortex), in favor of areas related to motor
and sensory function.
3.3.2. Avoidance tendencies
Avoidance and escape behaviors from known threatening cues,
such as money loss, have been correlated with bilateral amygdala
activation in an fMRI study.135 Another fMRI study found that
individuals with a tendency for avoidance behaviors had increased
amygdala activation for approached versus avoided stimuli,
regardless of stimuli valence.136 These studies seem to underlie
the role of amygdala modulation over avoidance tendencies. One
could hypothesize that amygdala activationmight dictate avoidant
behavioral responses.
3.3.3. Hypervigilance
In healthy individuals, interoceptive heartbeat sensitivity
predicted the degree of insula and medial dorsal cingulate
activation in an fMRI study.137 PTSD patients have shown a
neuroimaging pattern consistent with hypervigilance when
exposed to nonthreatening stimuli, compared to controls. This
pattern of hypervigilance included increased activation in dorsal
and rostral anterior cingulate, left amygdala and posterior parietal
regions.138 These ﬁndings support the enhanced involvement of
emotion processing regions during hypervigilance, a state docu-
mented to be present at baseline in PNES subjects.
3.3.4. Cognitive dysfunction in PTSD
Independent of dissociation, medial prefrontal cortex dysfunc-
tion has been hypothesized to be associated with attentional
deﬁcits associated with PTSD.139 In an fMRI study, a PTSD group
showed greater disruption than controls in the activation of the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex during emotionally irrelevant
scenes, suggesting an altered cognitive processing at baseline in
PTSD. During the emotionally salient distractors, PTSD patients
showed greater activation than controls in areas involved in
emotion processing, also supporting a heightened emotional
response.140
3.3.5. Somatic attention
When compared to external attention to a similar stimulus,
interoceptive attention to one’s heartbeat activated right hemi-
sphere parietal cortex in an fMRI study of healthy individuals.141
Right hemisphere lesions have been implicated in the genesis of
somatoform complaints in population studies.142 The anterior
cingulate and the insula have been implicated in the unpleasant
perception and generation of somatoform complaints in an fMRI
study that used sham mobile phone radiation.143 These studies
support the involvement of the right hemisphere and particularly
the insula, the parietal cortex and the anterior cingulate in the
generation and symptom attention observed in somatization.
3.3.6. Summary
The neurological dysfunction described in the vulnerability
traits enumerated above could hypothetically increase a patient’s
predisposition towards PNES. An overinvolvement of emotion
processing areas is seen in hypervigilance, whether in a
pathological state such as PTSD or in interoceptive tasks in
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(a function attributed to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), increased
focus on somatic function (a function attributed to the insula,
parietal cortex and anterior cingulate) and deﬁcits in emotion
expression or even awareness, like in alexithymia (probably
mediated through a different relationship between the areas
enumerated above), overlap in many of their physiological
activation patterns. While still considered separate constructs,
the fact that similar brain systems are involved in these traits may
help hypothesize a pathophysiological model vulnerable towards
PNES.
3.4. Functional neuroimaging studies in hypnosis
FunctionalMRI has been used to study changes during hypnotic
states, with the fMRI environment not affecting the hypnotic depth
and responsiveness that can be achieved.144
Highly hypnotizable individuals showed decoupling of the
frontal attention system (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex for
cognitive control and anterior cingulate cortex for conﬂict
monitoring) in an fMRI study. There was increased anterior
cingulate activation during a cognitive conﬂict task in the highly
susceptible individuals after the hypnotic induction, not accom-
panied by activation changes in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex.145 Another fMRI study showed that in highly hypnotizable
individuals, a speciﬁc posthypnotic suggestion that involved a
cognitive conﬂict task was related to reduced anterior cingulate
activationwhen compared to less hypnotizable individuals and the
no-suggestion state.146
The transient hypofrontality hypothesis of hypnosis suggests
that the focused attention that occurs during the hypnotic state
correlates with a change in activation of various prefrontal circuits,
eliminating their contribution to immediate conscious experience
(for a review, see Faymonville et al.147). The pattern of prefrontal
activation seen in hypnotizable subjects may be used as a
comparison model to the one proposed here for PNES, which
highlights a vulnerable and unstable cognitive-emotional atten-
tion system.
3.5. Bringing it all together for PNES
Based on the functional neuroimaging ﬁndings from conversion
and dissociative disorders, hypnosis and other related vulnerabili-
ty traits, speciﬁc brain dysfunction related to particular aspects of
PNES could be speculated. First, it appears that dysfunction at the
level of medial prefrontal regions and the anterior cingulate cortex
might mediate much of the instability observed in PNES in regard
to attention processes and emotion regulation.
Second, although the ﬁnal effectors that explain the clinical
phenomena might differ by clinical presentations (i.e., motor
cortex in conversion paralysis and right prefrontal cortex in
autobiographical retrieval deﬁcits), there is frequently a change in
the involvement of lateral prefrontal regions that very likely
contribute to the generation or modiﬁcation of the behavior in
question.
These ﬁrst two conclusions are consistent with Spence’s
hypothesis on the generation of conversion disorder,148 which
states that prefrontal cortex areas (with the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex involved in action generation and the orbitofrontal prefrontal
cortex involved in action suppression) routinely cooperate to
generate willful actions and their integration is disrupted in
conversion. This is supported by newmodels of cognitive executive
control, which add emotion processing as a component.149
To complicate matters even further, the interaction of the
prefrontal cortex with other neural systems is essential for the
generation of conscious experience.150 Dissociation can be anexample of neural systems acting autonomously (including
generation and suppression of several sensorimotor and/or
cognitive functions) as they do not reach anterior regions. When
such anterior regions are functionally integrated with the neural
systems responsible for the action or behavior, they can help
generate a sense of conscious experience. An altered relationship
between anterior, prefrontal regions and other neural systems also
explains some of the traits commonly seen in PNES including
alexithymia, altered cognitive processing, hypnotic susceptibility
and somatization. In addition to the role of the prefrontal cortex, I
would like to highlight the role of brain areas related to the sense of
self-agency, such as the TPJ, whichmight contribute to the sense of
lack of volitional control over the ﬁnal behavioral response.121
The brain systems involved in the actual behaviors during the
attack have not been studied. I believe it is likely that these ﬁnal
effectors could differ in each case depending on the speciﬁc
presentation. It would be useful, however, to conceptualize these
ﬁnal responses as pre-wired behavioral tendencies, usually
cognitively impenetrable, only deployed in the absence of suitable
cognitive functioning.
Studies on brain correlates of emotion processing in PNES are
necessary to elucidate the role of brain areas responsible for
emotional evaluation in the genesis of the attack and consequent
deployment of behavioral tendencies. Given the functional associa-
tion of brain regions responsible for emotion regulation and
conversion reactions,118,131 it is reasonable to speculate that high
emotional arousal might play a pivotal triggering role in the genesis
of the PNES. The inﬂuence of emotional states over cognitive control
has been described and recent models of executive control have
included brain areas relevant to emotion processing such the
amygdala, nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex interacting
with the executive areas of the brain such as the lateral prefrontal
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and parietal cortex149 (Fig. 2A). A
hypothetical connectivity abnormality between areas involved in
emotional evaluation and responses, cognitive integration systems
and/or pre-wired behavioral tendencies could explain the almost
automatic response seen in PNES (Fig. 2B).
It seems that PNES might be better explained at this point as an
alteration of the cognitive-emotional executive control circuitry.
As a result of this alteration, there is a failure in the coordination
and balance of different mental and somatic functions that allows
the release of pre-wired behavioral tendencies.
4. From speculation to recovery
While the above-described discussions on vulnerability traits
and pathophysiological correlates remain speculative, they could
offer some insight into the possible mechanisms that will provide
direction in the treatment of PNES.
The current evidence for treatment of PNES is limited by the
number of studies, small samples and open-label designs.151 A
promising approach that has shown evidence of efﬁcacy in two
open-label studies and one pilot randomized controlled trial
against standard medical care is cognitive-behavioral therapy
(CBT).152–154 As discussed above, PNES comprise a heterogeneous
group of patients22 and at this point it remains unclear if CBT will
provide a similar beneﬁt across different PNES subgroups. For
patients who experience beneﬁt from this treatment (as measured
by a decrease in PNES frequency), we still do not know which
particular treatment factors inﬂuence their improvement.
Limited knowledge about the mechanism of action of
therapeutic approaches exists for even well proven effective
treatments for other psychiatric conditions, such as CBT in panic
disorder with agoraphobia.155 Despite these limitations, based on
the psychopathological model of PNES discussed above, a few
speculations can be entertained.
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Fig. 2. Circuitry for cognitive-emotional executive control (A) and hypothetical alterations of this circuitry in PNES-related conditions (B). (A) The circuit highlights the
cognitive-emotional nature of executive control. Motor areas, sensory areas and insula have been added to the originally proposed circuit to highlight the inﬂuence of
executive control systems over these cortical areas involved in somatosensory functions. Solid line thickness indicates approximate connection strength. Dashed lines (added
to the original circuitry by Pessoa) indicate hypothetical connections between cognitive control areas or amygdala and somatosensory cortices. Thalamus and other basal
ganglia added without connectivity to simplify illustration. Adapted with permission from Nature Publishing Group: Pessoa L. On the relationship between emotion and
cognition, Nature Reviews Neuroscience, copyright 2008. (B) Solid circleswith increased thickness indicate areaswith increased activity in conversion or dissociation. Dashed
circles indicate brain areas with variable changes in activity in PNES-related conditions. Dashed circles with increased thickness indicate brain areas with variable function,
but most likely increased activity in PNES-related conditions. Arrows between areas are unchanged to simplify illustration. ACC: anterior cingulate cortex; LPFC: lateral
prefrontal cortex; OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; Thal/BG: thalamus/basal ganglia.
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might provide an explanation for a decreased tendency towards
the attacks. Relaxation training learned during CBT might be the
active ingredient for this aspect of improvement. Second, the
recognition of potential triggers for the attacks so that more
adaptive cognitive and behavioral skills are practiced and learned
as responses to such triggers could prove to be themain inﬂuential
factor in decreasing PNES with CBT.
Unfortunately in PNES, recognition of such triggers could
represent a signiﬁcant limitation because much of the hyper-
arousal responses are processed at a preconscious level.46 While
CBT might still prove effective for patients with difﬁculty
recognizing triggers, more time devoted to training PNES patients
on attention to internal states followed by an acceptance stance of
such states could place PNES patients where they can then readily
use the skills learned in CBT. Such attention retraining and
acceptance stance could provide a starting point towards a
reintegrative process for many of the functions that these patients
experience as difﬁcult to control. This latter approach is consistent
with a third-wave behavioral therapy theory, which utilizes
mindfulness-based techniques. Mindfulness-based therapies have
less empirical support than CBT for the treatment of psychiatric
disorders.156 Rather than contradicting CBT, mindfulness-based
techniques are likely to enhance the potential effectiveness of CBT.
Finally, other important therapeutic factors known to be
essential ingredients regardless of the treatment approach, such
as the therapeutic relationship,157 will inﬂuence treatment
outcome and should be considered as contributing to the patient’s
ability to incorporate the treatment-speciﬁc skills. The role of the
therapeutic relationship has been categorized as essential in the
treatment of dissociative disorders.158
5. Conclusion
We are beginning to understand the underlying pathogenic
mechanisms in PNES. While the research in this area is limited
compared to other psychiatric conditions, we are in a position to
hypothesize the following:
1. PNES are brief episodes that can be the result of various
psychopathological mechanisms including psychoform dissoci-
ation, somatoform dissociation, somatization and PTSD symp-
toms such as re-experiencing. Different trait vulnerabilities suchas alexithymia, avoidance tendencies, and variable use of
cognitive resources are likely to interact in different combina-
tions to confer vulnerability towards PNES.
2. Triggers for PNES may have emotional relevance and may be
processed outside of the patient’s awareness. No identiﬁed
emotional or sensory trigger might precede attacks as well.
3. When present, accompanying psychiatric conditions and cogni-
tive traits support the hypothesis that PNES patients have an
unstable cognitive-emotional information processing system.
4. The ﬁnal behavioral display during the attack probably consti-
tutes pre-wired, cognitively impenetrable behavioral tendencies.
5. The interaction between brain areas responsible for action
generation or suppression, self-agency and emotion processing
might play a pivotal role in the pathophysiology of PNES.
6. Promising therapeutic approaches are being explored for the
treatment of PNES and a more clear understanding of the
underlying pathogenic mechanisms in PNES may help tailor the
speciﬁc interventions and/or simply understand themechanism
of action of proven effective treatments.
PNES as well as other conversion and dissociative syndromes
are at a very early stage of understanding compared to other
psychiatric disorders. Future emphasis should be focused on
deﬁning psychopathological mechanisms, brain dysfunction and
effective treatments for these conditions.
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